Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement, signed on 30 September 1938 at the Munich Conference attended by the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, handed over the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany in the hope that this act of appeasement would prevent a world war and end the territorial expansion pursued by the leader of Nazi Germany Adolf Hitler (1889-1945).

Greater Germany

To understand why world leaders acted as they did at Munich, it is necessary to go back to 1935 and follow the trail of Hitler's land grabs. Hitler, ever since gaining power in 1933, had promised the German people that he would retake those territories the country had lost after the First World War (1914-18) and the humiliating Treaty of Versailles (1919). Further, Hitler wanted Lebensraum ('living space') for the German people, that is, new lands where they could prosper. Hitler's aggressive foreign policy saw a run of territorial 'recoveries'. First, Germany took back the coal-rich Saar region on Germany's western border, an area that had been governed by the League of Nations (the forerunner of today's United Nations) since the end of WWI. In March 1935, voters in the Saar decided overwhelmingly to rejoin Germany. Hitler, encouraged by the lack of an effective international response to Japan's invasion of Chinese Manchuria in 1931 and Italy's invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, next occupied the Rhineland, an area between Germany and France which the Versailles Treaty had stipulated must remain demilitarised. German troops entered the Rhineland in March 1936.

Hitler formally repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and embarked on a programme of rearmament. In 1936, he made alliances with Italy: the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1938, Hitler turned to neighbouring Austria, the country of his birth. Anschluss ('fusion') with Austria would tie in another 6.7 million German speakers into what Hitler called his 'Greater Germany'. Austria had significant natural resources and foreign currency reserves. Possession of Austria would also give Hitler an excellent strategic platform for further expansion. Hitler mobilised his army, which crossed the border on 12 March. Crucially, Hitler had three factors in his favour: the support of half of the Austrian population, the Austrian army was incapable of effective resistance, and the fascist dictator of Italy Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) had promised he would not interfere. The Austrian government capitulated, radio messages urged people not to resist, and Austria became a province of the Third Reich.

Britain and France, now whole-heartedly pursuing a policy of appeasement towards Hitler in the hope he would settle for the gains he had made already, did not feel this expansion could justify a world war. After all, the lands taken so far contained primarily German speakers, and the majority (as a plebiscite in Austria showed) were happy enough with the move. The problem was Hitler was not satisfied. Now the dictator turned to Czechoslovakia, in particular the Sudetenland region, although in May 1938, Hitler told his generals he intended to occupy the whole of Czechoslovakia.

The Sudetenland

Cezochslovakia was a democratic republic where Germans were only a minority, an entirely different situation from any of Hitler's previous acquisitions. Hitler would use bluff and bluster again, but this time, he must use diplomacy to get what he wanted rather than soldiers crossing a border. There was extra risk here since Czechoslovakia had excellent fixed defences on its borders, possessed a modern heavy industry, and had a well-equipped army of one million men.

With hindsight, now that we know Hitler went on to further conquests in both the East and West, the dictator's statement that Czechoslovakia was an enemy aircraft carrier in Central Europe has particular significance. Hitler may have been opportunistic in taking advantage of the diplomatic errors of his future enemies, but, if he did have plans to dominate Europe, it was obvious that something had to be done about Czechoslovakia first. The Sudetenland, now surrounded on three sides by German territory and with a majority population of German speakers – some 3 million of them – was a perfect slice to aim for as a first bite.

Hitler thought that Britain or France would be unwilling or even unable to go to war in 1938. The USSR and France had signed a treaty in 1935 promising to protect Czechoslovakia from outside aggression, but the USSR was only bound to act if France mobilised first. Hitler thought it unlikely that France would act first, certainly not without Britain. The attitude of the British government, then, was the key to what became known as the Czech Crisis.

Czechoslovakia had been created after WWI, from regions that had once been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The government was headed by President Edvard Beneš (1884-1948), and he governed a cosmopolitan population which consisted of 10 million Czechs, 3 million Slovaks, 3 million German speakers, 700,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ukrainians, and 60,000 Poles. The government of Czechoslovakia was dominated by Czechs, which did lead to discontent from the other groups, who felt their interests were not being properly represented. Hitler exploited these grievances by funding such parties as the Nazi Sudeten German Party (SdP) led by Konrad Henlein (1898-1945) and getting them to stir up trouble. For the Germans at home and the foreign press, Hitler made speeches about how the Sudeten Germans were being repressed – entirely untrue. At the same time, the German minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) orchestrated a sustained campaign of misinformation on the same theme.

Chamberlain Meets Hitler

In 1938, Hitler ordered his generals to prepare an invasion plan, code-named Fall Grün ('Case-Green'). Troops were moved to the southern border. Case-Green was assigned a secret start date: 30 September. It looked like Hitler intended to invade, but was the dictator merely pushing for a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in his favour? Then again, there was discontent with Hitler amongst the top German generals. The German Army was not ready for a war. It could face the Czechoslovak army, although the two sides were evenly matched, but it would certainly be overwhelmed if France also moved its army in the west. As British Member of Parliament Robert Boothby put it:

All the German generals were convinced that if war broke out over Czechoslovakia in September 1938 they would have been defeated in about three weeks…They had intended to arrest Hitler and proclaim a military government.

(Holmes, 71)

If Hitler could obtain Czechoslovakia through diplomacy alone, his position at home would be unassailable. Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940), the British prime minister, certainly thought diplomacy could avoid a war. Chamberlain visited Hitler in Bavaria on 15 September to try and persuade him not to take aggressive action against Czechoslovakia. Hitler proposed Germany be given the Sudetenland if a plebiscite indicated the population's approval of such a measure. Chamberlain agreed in principle and extracted from Hitler a promise that no military action would be taken until the British Parliament had met over the issue and France had been consulted. Hitler readily agreed, all the more time to organise Case-Green.

The British and French governments agreed to Hitler's demand, but the Czechoslovak government rejected it on the grounds that it would, sooner or later, bring the entire country under Hitler's domination. Britain and France then gave the Czechoslovak government the ultimatum that if it did not hand over the Sudetenland, then neither country would help what remained of Czechoslovakia in the future. As Beneš succinctly put it, "we have been basely betrayed" (Shirer, 391).

Chamberlain, eager to give the good news, met Hitler on 22 September. Hitler, sensing Chamberlain was willing to avoid a war at almost any cost, now increased his demands: Czechoslovakia must also concede territory to Poland and Hungary, and all Czechs must leave the Sudetenland (taking with them only a minimum of their property). Chamberlain agreed to the new demands in principle, but the British Parliament subsequently rejected them, as did the French government. Beneš, meanwhile, mobilised the Czechoslovak army. On 26 September, Hitler made a speech in Berlin attacking the Czechoslovak government. On 27 September, Britain mobilised its navy. War seemed inevitable, and Chamberlain famously stated in a BBC radio broadcast at 8:30 p.m.:

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.

(McDonough, 77).

The Munich Conference

Europe was brought back from the brink of war at the eleventh hour. Late into the night, Hitler and Chamberlain exchanged telegrams. Hitler suggested that Germany would absorb the Sudetenland but guarantee the rest of Czechoslovakia's independence. A telegram was sent to Mussolini, who was eager to delay a war given Italy's poor state of rearmament, urging him to persuade Hitler to hold a conference in Munich so that the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy could have one last chance at solving the crisis through diplomacy. Hitler accepted Mussolini's proposal. The Munich Conference was held in the Führerbau building in Munich on 29 and 30 September 1938. The United States, pursuing an isolationist policy, did not attend, and neither the USSR nor Czechoslovakia were invited. The USSR was considered, after its massive purge of the Red Army, to be too militarily weak to be of any use in the affair, and Chamberlain did not trust its leader, Joseph Stalin (1878-1953). The Czechoslovak government's position was already known.

Agreement to Appease

The policy of appeasement was now given its sternest test. Since 1935, world leaders had been hoping that Hitler's latest land grab would be his last. Avoiding a world war was the absolute priority, although not at any cost. Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland was considered cheap enough to give away. There was a minority who argued strongly against appeasement, notably Winston Churchill (1874-1965), the future British prime minister. Even those who thought appeasement had little real chance of success at least hoped it would buy valuable time for countries to rearm. Crucially, public opinion in Britain and France was not only against the idea of war but even rearmament. In this context, then, the Munich Agreement was a relief for everyone, perhaps even Hitler whose economy and armed forces were still not quite ready for war.

Chamberlain was convinced of peace and that he could trust Hitler's word. As John Colville, the prime minister's assistant private secretary noted:

Chamberlain was deeply devoted to the idea of peace, to him war was the ultimate horror, he'd seen his contemporaries die in Flanders in 1914-18 and he felt that his life's work was to prevent a repetition of the appalling massacres of the First World War.

(Holmes, 65)

Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was backed up by the majority of the British people. As Rab Butler, the British under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, notes:

…if you want to get the record straight the real reason for not standing up in 1938 was the absolute saturation of the country in peace propaganda…the defence hadn't been re-started and the public was pacifist-minded and the Commonwealth was divided, which it wasn't in 1939, and American opinion was not with us at the time of Munich.

(Holmes, 67)

France's representative at Munich was Prime Minister Edouard Daladier (1884-1970). Daladier, like Chamberlain, had experienced the horrors of WWI personally. Daladier's hands were tied since France was utterly unprepared for war. Mussolini, representing Italy, was in exactly the same position, he thought his armed forces would only be ready for a conflict in 1943. Mussolini was content to play the role of neutral mediator at Munich. Hitler, as we have seen, also had problems with the preparedness and loyalty of his armed forces. Hitler met Mussolini on his train to Munich the morning of the conference, and the Italian leader agreed with Hitler that whatever was decided later that day, "the time will come when we shall have to fight side by side against France and England" (Shirer, 414). Significantly, Daladier and Chamberlain made no such pre-conference consultation. Both had already convinced their consciences that they could legally hand over the Sudetenland because the region had never received its plebiscite for self-determination as promised in the Treaty of Versailles. For the moment, then, all four leaders at Munich were only too glad to postpone a war and to do so at any price. Ironically, the only state that was prepared for a war was the absent Czechoslovakia.

The Munich conference had each leader speak in turn in a rather informal and hospitable atmosphere according to the interpreter, a Dr. Schmidt. The meeting lasted for several hours as Mussolini proposed what Hitler had told him to propose earlier in the day. In short, Hitler was given exactly what he wanted. The Munich Agreement document was signed by all parties (Germany, France, Italy, and Britain) at 1 a.m. on 30 September.

Points of the Munich Agreement

The Munich Agreement stated:

• Germany will absorb the Sudetenland by 10 October.
• Germany's new expanded borders will be recognised by an international commission.
• Czechs must leave the Sudetenland by 10 October, and the region must not be stripped of its resources.
• The remainder of Czechoslovakia was given assurances for its independence, and there will be plebiscites (this never happened).
• Germany and Italy will recognise the new borders and promise to guarantee the remainder of Czechoslovakia against any future act of aggression (this also never happened).

The post-conference atmosphere was almost jovial. Daladier told war anecdotes and Chamberlain fishing stories to the Nazi leader, but "Hitler was full of contempt for them both and later called them 'little worms'" (Stone, 110). Two Czechoslovak diplomats were invited to Munich only to hear what the Great Powers had decided to do with their country. The people of Czechoslovakia felt utterly betrayed. In a final flourish, Hitler willingly signed a document prepared by Chamberlain, which promised that Britain and Germany would never go to war against each other.

Consequences of Munich

On returning home, Chamberlain proudly declared to the British people that he had achieved "peace with honour" and "peace in our time" (Shirer, 420). Roosevelt sent a telegram saying "Good man" (McDonough, 78). Chamberlain was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Perhaps fittingly given future events, he did not win it, the 1938 prize was given instead to an organization devoted to helping refugees founded by the Norwegian polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930). Daladier was also welcomed back home by relieved and cheering crowds. Hitler received a joyous parade in Berlin. According to Albert Speer, Germany's future armaments minister, Hitler's followers were "now completely convinced of their leader's invincibility" (169). As Goebbels more soberly noted, "We were all hanging by a thread over a bottomless pit, now we have ground beneath our feet again…everyone is overjoyed about keeping the peace" (Gellately, 280). Even the Jewish diarist Victor Klemperer was obliged to admit in his entry for 5 October that Hitler had worked a strategic wonder: "Munich is Hitler's Austerlitz" (270), a reference to the great tactical victory of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) at the 1805 Battle of Austerlitz.

On 5 October 1938, the Sudetenland was absorbed into Germany, and Henlein was made its Gauleiter (regional governor). In the second week of October, Poland grabbed the eastern part of the region of Teschen (Český Těšín to the Czechs, Ciesyn to the Poles). On 14 March 1939, Slovakia declared itself independent – an act which was encouraged by Hitler as a means to break up Czechoslovakia – but it became a German client state under the leadership of Jozef Tiso (1887-1947). On 15 March, on the pretext that they were "invited to restore order" (McDonough, 80), German soldiers marched into what remained of Czechoslovakia (essentially Bohemia and Moravia). Hungary seized the southern parts of Ruthenia and a southern slice of Slovakia – both of these areas had large or majority Hungarian populations. Munich had not saved but destroyed Czechoslovakia.

Far to the east, it was clear to Stalin that the Western powers were happy for Germany to expand as long as it was in his direction. As one Soviet diplomat noted, the USSR's absence from Munich had meant not putting "our foot on a rotten plank" (Taylor, 237). Stalin must look elsewhere for allies in a coming war. Germany and the USSR signed a military alliance, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Nazi-Soviet Pact) in August 1939.

In March 1939, Germany seized Memelland in Lithuania. In April, Mussolini occupied Albania. Britain and France then promised to guarantee Poland's borders. It had finally dawned on the Western governments that the fascists were intent on territorial expansion at any cost. Hitler ignored the diplomacy and invaded Poland on 1 September. Once more Europe, and soon to be the world, was at war.

With the benefit of hindsight, then, the Munich Agreement had been a mistake, a lost opportunity to rebuff Hitler before Germany became even stronger. As Boothby succinctly put it: "Munich was one of the greatest disasters in British and French history" (Holmes, 70). But it is important to note, as the historian A. J. P. Taylor does, that "When the policy of Munich failed, everyone announced that he had expected it to fail…In fact, no one was as clear-sighted as he later claimed to have been" (232-3). This deception was Hitler's real achievement at Munich, but it was a false victory, one that would only end in the almost total destruction of Germany in the Second World War (1939-45).